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Forecasts ofCalifornia water supply and demand
to the year2000 suggest thatoverall supplies will be
ample. Butaccording to the same studies, the state's
total water supplies are distributed so unevenly
geographically that a chronic shortage could devel-
op in certain areas by the late 1980's. I Southern
California-which currently accounts for two-
thirds of the state's total water consumption-is
particularly vulnerable to a potential shortfall. De-
spite an increase in projected demand, that area by
the mid-1980's will lose over one-half of the 1.2
million acre-feet of surface water it currently re-
ceives annually from the Colorado River.
2
Most proposed solutions to the problem have
called for an expansion ofsupplies for prospective
water-short areas, primarily by the construction of
new dams and canals to bring more water from
Northernto SouthernCalifornia. Recently, the most
intense debate has centeredon the PeripheralCanal,
a proposed addition to the StateWaterProjectwhich
would cross the Delta formed by the Sacramento
and San Joaquin rivers at the head ofSan Francisco
Bay and bring more water to Southern California.
(An overwhelming negative vote from Northern
California voters caused the plan to be rejected in
the June 1982 election.) Butprograms to expandthe
Central Valley Project-the huge Federally-owned
water system-also have created considerable
controversy.
An alternative approach-aneconomic approach
-would solve the problem through pricing reform,
as a means of reducing the projected growth of
demand.
3 According to this view, the projected
supply-demand imbalance reflects the assumed
continuation ofinefficient pricing practices follow-
ed by Federal, state and local agencies (utilities) in
pricing water at all stages ofdistribution. Ifwater
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were priced higher, final-users would have agreater
incentive to conserve, the projected demand would
be lower, and someorall ofthe proposed new water
facilities would not be required. The present arti~le
follows this approach in analyzing the pricing of
surface irrigation water supplied from the Central
Valley Project (CVP) and sold at wholesale by the
U.S. Bureau ofReclamation (Bureau).
Agriculture accounts for about 85 percent ofthe
total water consumed annually in California. The
Central Valley Project is the single largest supplier,
accounting for nearly 40 percent oftotal irrigation
water, with the State Water Project and ground-
water sources accounting for the remainder. The
pricing practices followed by the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation in pricing irrigation waterat wholesale
thus significantly influence the general level of
water prices ultimately faced by the important agri-
cultural sector.
Economic theory suggests that resources would
be allocated most efficiently ifthe Bureau based its
rates for CVP irrigation water on the "long-run
incremental cost" of supplying that water. This
concept refers to the costofdelivering an additional
unit (acre-foot) of water, taking into account the
need to add more fixed factors, namely new plant
facilities. Pricing all CVP irrigation water on the
basis ofthe cost ofthe last increment would be the
most efficient method of allocating scarce re-
sources, because customers would then be aware of
the cost of the resources required to bring them
additional water.
In this paper an estimate oflong-run incremental
costbasedon the cost ofbuilding the nextscheduled
block ofcapacity-namely, the proposed Auburn-
Folsom South Unit-is developed. This estimated
long-run incremental cost is far higher than the
"replacement average cost"-the average cost of
irrigation water from the existing plant (including
both old and new facilities), when this plant is
valued at its current replacement cost, i.e., theopportunity cost to society ofthe resources that are
currently tied up in supplying water. The differen-
tial is even greater between incremental .cost and
"historical average cost"-the average unit costof
water from the existing plant, with the lattervalued
on ahistorical (original) costbasis. Mostregulatory
commissions use the historical pricing method for
investor-owned utilities under theirjurisdiction.
Yet today, the Bureau ofReclamation is realizing
an average price for Central Valley Project irriga-
tion water that does not even recover full historical
average costlet alone the averagecost.
In implementing reclamation law, which calls for
such practices as basing rates on farmers' ability to
pay and not chargingintereston publicfunds invest-
ed in the CVP irrigation system, the Bureau is
requiring taxpayers and electrical users to pay a
substantial subsidy per acre-foot of Federal irriga-
tion water supplied. The subsidy is even greater
when the realized average price is measured against
the "true" average cost-average cost on a re-
placement cost basis.
The purpose ofthis study is to describe and mea-
sure how Bureau prices for Central Valley Project
irrigation water deviate from the efficiency model
and to discuss the implications of higher relative
water prices for the California agriculture sector's
demand for Federal irrigation water.
Section I discusses the economic-efficiency
argument for pricing on the basis oflong-run incre-
mental cost. As noted there, water utilities tradi-
tionally have followed other pricing methods
because their operations presumably have been
characterized by decreasing long-run replacement
average costs owing to economies ofscale. Under
such conditions, pricing on the basis ofincremental
cost would fail to recover average cost valued on a
replacement cost basis, and thus would result in a
loss. But as Section n indicates in the case of the
Central Valley Project, long-run incremental cost
today actually is far higher than the average cost of
CVP irrigation water, even when average cost is
measuredon a replacementbasis. This suggests that
waterprovision is no longeradecreasing costindus-
try. In Section HI, we show that the realized
by the Bureau do not cover the actual costs of
supplying that water, partly because oftheBureau's
failure to recover full historical cost, and partly
because ofthe failure ofthe utility industry's histor-
ical accounting methods to reflect inflation over
time. In Sections IV and V, we discuss some ofthe
implications of higher Federal irrigation water
prices for the demand for water, and also for the
future development ofthe CVP irrigation system.
I. Rationalefor Different Pricing Methods
Social objectives related to the development of
the arid West and the creation ofa prosperous farm
sector have traditionally guided the Bureau ofRec-
lamation in its pricing of irrigation water
4 (see
Box). To foster these objectives, Federal reclama-
tion law has limited the agricultural sector's repay-
ment responsibility to its "ability to pay," a con-
cept described later. But in the course offostering
such objectives, the Bureau not only has failed to
recover the full historical average cost for irriga-
tion water but has not even consistently utilized the
traditional av,~ra:ge-co~;t
by utility regulatory commissions for private
investor-owned utilities.
Under this standard historical average-cost
the first determines its revenue
requirement for a particular function, for example,
electrical power or irrigation water. 5 This refers to
the total costs that must be recovered through rates
during a given period to compensate the utility for
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all the expenses incurred in supplying the product,
including a return on invested capital.
6 Under pres-
ent statutes, total revenues must exactly equal total
costs, a requirement known as the budgetary con-
straint. Dividing total costs by the number ofunits
expected to be sold in a given period yields the
average unitcost-andthus theprice-ofthe prod-
uct. the "ability to pay" doctrine has led
the Bureau to set its price below the level implied by
this type ofcomputation.
In economic theory, the value of the resources
embodiedin eachunit is determinedonthe
basis ofthe replacementcostoftheplantemployed.
As we shall see, utility commissions have used
economic theory as the rationale for pricing on the
basis of average cost. But prescribed an
accounting method for measuring average cost
which understates the true replacement average
cost.But even if the Bureau had priced its water ac-
cording to the true economic definition of average
cost, that method still would nothave been the most
efficient in allocating resources. Theory also
demonstrates that for efficient resource allocation
thepriceperunit should be equalnotto average cost
but rather to incremental cost. Incremental cost is
the change in total cost resulting from an additional
unit of output-that is, the cost of producing one
more unit ofa good or service, oralternatively, the
costthatwouldbe savedbyproducingoneless unit.
A of economics states that
optimum efficiency is achieved when the prices of
goods and services are equal to their marginal cost
of production. Under such conditions, resources
would be channelled into their most efficient uses. 7
This is because each price would reflectthe value of
the resources required to supply each particular
good or service, and because consumers therefore
would be provided with the proper price signals to
make the choices that would yield society the most
efficient use of resources. If price were less than
marginal cost, consumers would be induced to con-
sume an additional unit, even if the benefits were
less than the marginal commitment of society's
resources to produce that unit.
An important point is the distinction between
short and long-run, which is based on whether or
not plant size is fixed. Short-run calculations show
how a firm's costswill vary in responseto variations
in output within the limits of a given amount of
fixed plant. Long-run calculations show how costs
vary during a planningperiod long enoughto permit
adjustment of the scale of productive (or distribu-
tion) facilities.
Water pricing decisions thus depend upon
whetherornotthe scaleofplantis tobe increased.If
new plant is scheduled during the planning period
encompassedin the rate calculation, long-run incre-
mental (marginal) cost is the appropriate basis for
efficient I.e., be
to long-run incremental cost.8 Long-run incremen-
tal costequalsthe costofwaterproducedbythe next
block of new storage and conveyance facilities
scheduled to be added. Under that the
price per unit thus reflects only the cost of water
produced from new productive facilities-in con-
trast to the regulators' favored method of average
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cost pricing, which also reflects the cost of water
from olderfacilities.
Regulatory agencies traditionally have not fol-
lowedthe incrementalprecept in establishingutility
rates because oftheir assumption, in their rate set-
ting, that utility operations are characterized by
decreasing long-run average costs. Decreasing
long-run costs are the result ofincreasing returns to
scale, which mean that a larger plant has lower unit
costs than a relatively smaller plant. Average pro-
duction costs decline for the individual firm with
any increase in the size ofits one or more
facilities). Economies of scale are internal to the
operationofthe individual firm, in contrastto exter-
nal economies which arise out ofthe growth ofthe
entire industry.
9
Most importantly, economiesofscale aredefined
for a particular point in time. At any given time, a
firm would be operating in an output range associat-
ed with decreasing long-run average cost ifexpan-
sion to a larger-scale plant (or system) built from
scratch entailed lower average costs than a smaller
plant also built at that time.
With increasing returns to scale, the long-run
incremental cost associated with a given supply of
water is less than its long-run average cost. Hence,
if selling prices were established on the basis of
incremental cost (the cost ofthe last unit), average
cost would not be recovered, and the result would
be a loss. But this "loss," as measured by econo-
mists, exists because of the specific manner in
which average cost is defined, with reference to the
replacement cost of fixed plant. In practice, incre-
mental cost pricing could yield accounting profits
because regulators traditionally have valued plantat
historic (original) purchase prices. However, in an
industry characterized by decreasing returns to
scale and increasing average costs-the CVP case
-incremental costs exceed average costs and thus
incremental cost pricing would result in a profit in
an economic as well as sense.
Chart I-A shows the characteristicsofdecreasing
long-run average cost that originally led govern-
ments to grant utilities monopoly status and to insti-
tute pricing. 10 The demand schedule
D, which shows the quantity that will be demanded
by customers at each price, intersects the long-run
average cost schedule (LRAC) at an output level
where further expansion in plant size (scale) willreduce average unit cost, i.e., before the least-cost
size.
To achieve the most efficient allocation of re-
sources possible under regulated-monopoly condi-
tions, the utility would have to follow incremental-
cost pricing. Under that method, the price (Pic)
would be determined by the cost of production of
the last unit, that is, by the intersection of the
demand schedule (D) andthe long-run incremental-
cost curve (LRIC). But setting the unit price at Pic
would generate losses for the firm (or agency) under
conditions ofdecreasing long-run average costs, in
that the cost ofthe last unit ofoutput would be less
than the average replacement cost per unit. These
losses would be represented by the area, (PI-Pic) x
Qic'
To avoid the necessity for public subsidies to
offset these losses, rate-setting commissions origi-
nally selected average-cost pricing, incorporating
in the average cost a rate of return on invested
capital. Under this method, the maximum price per
unit is set at (Pac)' the intersection of the demand
schedule (D) and the long-run average cost curve
(LRAC). Under conditions oftrue decreasing long-
run average cost, this method ofpricing results in a
higher unit price and lower level of output than
would result from the more efficient incremental
cost method. This is because long-run average cost
is above long-run incremental cost under such
conditions.
Chart I-B illustrates the price and output combi-
nations that would result under alternative pricing
methods if the utility were operating in a range of
increasing long-run averagecosts due to the exhaus-
tion ofeconomies ofscale. This situationcharacter-
izes most utility systems today; for example, the
CVP is operating in an output range where further
expansion in size raises the average unit production
cost, that is, where the incremental unit cost is
above the average cost, measured on a replacement
basis. Undersuch conditions, pricingonthe basisof
long-run incremental costresults in a price (Pie> and
output level (QiC)' That price would yield a profit
beyond the return incorporated in average cost, in
that the cost ofthe last unit ofoutput would be more
than the average cost per unit. The excess profit
would be represented by the area, (Pic- PI) X Qic'
To avoid excess profits, regulators could follow
the replacement average-cost method, which would
result in price (Pac) and output level (QaC>. But
average-cost pricing, even under conditions oftrue
increasing long-run average costs, results in an
Chart 1
Pricing Alternatives in a Regulated Monopoly Situation
A. Utility Operating in a Range of
Decreasing Long-run Average Costs'
Price &Cost
Per Unit
B. Utility Operating in a Range of
Increasing Long-Run Average Costs'
Price &Cost
Per Unit
Q ao Q io Output Q", Q"Output
1Describes behaviorof costs at agiven point in time.
'Based on plant valued at current prices, Le., prices prevailing at the given
point in time to,which the cost schedules apply.
38under-pricing ofthe product and a correspondingly
greaterand uneconomic amount ofresources devot-
edto its production. The use ofhistorical ratherthan
replacement average cost results in a still lower
price and greater uneconomic amount of resources
devoted to its production.
II. Central Valley Project's Long-Run Incremental Cost
Congress has authorized a number offacilities to
expand the Central Valley Project, some of which
face an uncertain future due to environmentalist
oppositionand uncertain funding. Forthatreason, it
is difficult to identify for analysis the next large
block ofcapacity likely to be added to the system.
The most likely candidate is the proposed Auburn-
Folsom South Unit, located between Sacramento
and Stockton. The project would consist of the
Auburn Dam, the Folsom South Canal and several
smaller structures, including the Sugar Pine Dam
and Reservoir, the County Line Dam and Reservoir
and associated conduits. II In addition to generating
as much as 450,000 kilowatts of electric power
annually, the project when fully operational would
supply about 440,000 acre-feet of water for irriga-
tion and 300,000acre-feet for municipal and indus-
trial uses in the southern Sacramento and northern
San Joaquin Valleyareas. 12
To date, only the foundation ofthe Auburn Dam
and some sections ofthe Folsom South Canal have
been completed. Congress has authorized (obli-
gated) nearly $2.2 billion for construction, includ-
ing about $1.2 billion for irrigation purposes, but
the actions of environmentalists and the failure of
Congress to appropriate allocated funds have halted
further construction,I3
The project's long-run incremental cost would
equal the annual costofadding an acre-footofwater
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P Proposedcost, we estimate the future stream ofannual costs
in constant dollars-in this case, in 1981 dollars.
We then determine the present value ofthis future
streamofcosts bydiscounting at anappropriate real
rateofinterest. Multiplying the presentvalue bythe
real rate ofinterest yields the annual costofinvest-
ing resources in this project rather than using them
elsewhere in the economy. Finally, dividing this
annual cost by the project's expected annual output
yields an estimate oflong-run incremental cost
Appendix 14
For purposes, we have used the real
rate of return before taxes, i.e., a nominal rate of
interest minus the current rate ofinflation. Also, we
have determined that rate on an opportunity-cost
basis-one that assures the general taxpayer a rate
ofreturn on invested capital equal to that earned on
average in a private-utility sector financed solely
through long-term debt. This assumes little differ-
ence in risk between the Federal and private-utility
sectors, since the latter is regulated to ensure a
reasonable rate ofreturn.
Specifically, we have selecteda real discount rate
of10 percent-thereal rate prescribed by the Office
of Management and Budget for evaluating Federal
projects.
15 The rate is also consistent with a16
percent current nominal interest rate for new utility
bonds, minus an inflation rate of 6 percent. Em-
ploying these assumptions, we estimate the long-
run incremental cost of irrigation water from the
proposed Auburn-Folsom South Unit project to be
around $324/acre-foot. 16
If it followed efficiency criteria, the Bureau
would price all CVPirrigation wateron the basis of
incremental cost. In establishing rates forany given
future period, the Bureau would set the unit price
equal to the long-run incremental costofthe appro-
priate block of scheduled capacity. That practice
would make wholesale customers aware ofthe eco-
nomic value of the resources required to supply
additional increments. Instead, in 1981, the Bureau
realized an average price of slightly over $5/acre-
foot for CVP irrigation water-=-in contrast to the
$324/acre-foot price called for under purely eco-
nomic criteria. This suggests that far more
resources are devoted to the Federal supply of irri-
gation water than are warranted by the value ofthe
agricultural commodities produced.
IU. Differential Between Long-Run Incrementaland Average Cost
Three basic reasons can be found for the
differential between the estimated long-run incre-
mental cost and the latest realized average price of
CVP irrigation water. First, the Bureau has not
followed the traditional utility pricing model, so
that its average realized price is far below the full
averagecostdeterminedon an historical accounting
basis. Ses;ond, the traditional utility model fails to
reflect replacement cost. Third, the long-run incre-
mental costofirrigation waterwould behigherthan
"true" (economic) averagecost, measured by aver-
age replacementcost.
Traditionally, a utility determines the capital
costs to be recovered through revenues on the basis
of its historical (original) cost of plant and equip-
ment. These capital charges include such items as
depreciation, interest, and property taxes. During
periods of rapid inflation, when the cost of new
equipment rises far beyond the original costofsim-
ilar equipment acquired in the past, this historical
accounting method yields a of
average costthan the replacementcost method. Yet
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the Bureau does not even recover average cost de-
termined under the historical accounting method.
The reasons are: I)reclamation law does not require
the Bureau to recover interest on Federal funds
invested in irrigation projects; 2) reclamation law
limits the repayment responsibility of farmers to
their "ability to pay"; 3) the Bureau supplies water
under long-term contracts at fixed rates which are
not adjusted upward to reflect the blending in of
new higher-cost capacity; 4) the Bureau pays no
property tax as would a private utility and 5) by
periodically extending the assumed lifetime of the
plant, the Bureau has reduced the amortization
charged on past investments.
1. Interestsubsidy: TheReclfuliation Actof1902
required beneficiaries to repay the construction
costs of Federal irrigation projects, but did not re-
quire payment of interest. 17 Congress has retained
that interest subsidy ever since.
Somecriticsclaimthat an "opportunity" interest
rate should be recovered on these CClngressional
appropriations, in the form of the prevailing aver-age yield on long-term Treasury bonds at the time
the debt is incurred.
18 The author would go even
further and use the average rate paid by private
utilities for new bond issues. In other words, the
appropriate comparison should be between the Fed-
eral and private utility sectors, and not between the
Federal utility sector and the Federal government
sector in general. On that basis, the public would
earn as great a return on funds invested in the
Federal utility sector as it could earn from purehas-
ingprivate-utility bonds. Over the 1948-81 period,
the average yieldon Aaa public utility bonds ranged
from 2.6 to 15.6 percent.
2. Abilitytopay: In a series oflaws passed in 1914
and 1926, Congress extended the repayment period
on irrigation projects from 10 to 40 years, 19 to help
provide reliefto hard-pressed farmers during reces-
sion periods. Then, in the Reclamation Actof1936,
Congressextendedthe repaymentperiodto 50years
and introduced the "ability to pay" concept. Under
that provision, farmers are required to repay only
thatportionofirrigation watercosts they can afford.
Their ability to pay (payment capacity) is measured
as a residual equal to the net increase in revenues
attributable to project water.
Table 1
Reconciliation of Realized and Imputed Unit Price for Central Valley Irrigation Water
Underthe(Historical) Average Cost Method
(Dollars per acre/foot)
Actual Imputed Imputed
Unit Price Operation & Imputed Costs3 Interest-Subsidized Imputed Full-Cost
Fiscal Year! As Realized2 Maintenance4 Taxes Amortization Unit Price" Interest UnitPrice6
1948-1960 2.83 2.40 4.43 3.08 9.91 3.96 13.87
1961 3.48 3.72 5.02 4.19 12.93 5.48 18.41
1962 1.93 1.78 2.37 2.02 6.17 2.59 8.76
1963 2.37 1.95 3.29 2.75 7.99 4.18 12.17
1964 3.32 1.12 4.56 3.87 9.55 5.96 15.51
1965 2.14 2.29 2.93 2.50 7.72 3.78 11.50
1966 3.33 3.89 4.24 3.47 11.60 5.16 16.76
1967 1.88 1.52 3.31 2.59 7.42 3.78 11.20
1968 7.87 .77 12.85 9.89 23.51 19.68 43.19
1969 2.47 3.22 5.78 4.20 13.20 8.21 21.41
1970 4.16 3.38 5.38 3.99 12.75 7.71 20.46
1971 3.47 3.22 5.37 3.76 12.35 7.20 19.55
1972 4.46 3.53 5.62 3.94 13.09 7.37 20.46
1973 3.29 2.57 4.51 3.40 10.48 6.84 17.32
1974 3.70 2.33 3.71 2.86 8.90 5.67 14.57
1975 4.20 2.79 4.32 3.20 10.31 7.03 17.34
1976 6.84 4.60 5.56 4.13 14.29 9.14 23.43
1977 5.41 9.83 17.35 13.11 40.29 29.73 70.02
1978 4.02 3.83 3.90 3.99 11.72 8.92 20.64
1979 5.83 3.84 2.69 3.48 10.01 7.62 17.63
1980 4.55 3.91 2.84 3.67 10.42 9.66 20.08
1981 5.09 3.99 3.26 4.21 11.46 12.31 23.77
! Fiscal yearending June 30 until 1976, andending September30 for later years.
2 Derived for any given period by dividing revenues from water sales to irrigation districts, under 9-c water-service type contracts, as
reported by total sales to those districts. The recovery ofcosts associated with CVP-financeddistribution systems under9-d repayment
type contracts is excludedfrom this analysis. Forderivation see Appendix B, Table I.
a For derivation ofthe various imputed-cost components, see Appendix B, Table 2. Note that 1968 and 1977 were drought years, i.e.,
years when waterdeliveries fell considerably, raising capitalcostsperunit. Also, in 1968 there was a large new investment in irrigation
capacity.
4 As reported by the Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau is required by law to recover operation and maintenance costs incurred in
supplying irrigation water from the Central Valley Project. Yet in some years, the realized price did not even cover operation and
maintenance costs.
5 Excludes interest.
6 Derivedon the basisofthe average-costpricing method, with costsdeterminedon the basisofthe original(historical) valueofplantand
equipment, in keeping with traditional regulated utility practice. Forderivation see Appendix B, Table 2 and technical notes.
42More specifically, the Bureau detennines pay-
ment capacity by comparing the estimated gross
income from a representative small fann in a given
irrigation district undertwo differentsetsofdry and
irrigated fanning conditions. From the increase in
gross income attributable to project water, the
Bureau subtracts the increase in non-water costs
required to increase fann yields. These include
operating (variable) andcapital (fixed) costs, plus a
projected rate of profit (return on investment) suf-
ficient to encourage the fanner to increase fann
yields.
20 The Bureau then charges the irrigation
district the cost of service or ability-to-pay price,
whichever is lower. Ifthe costofservice, excluding
interest, exceeds payment capacity, the remaining
costs are recovered from the sale ofelectric power
and municipal and industrial water. The Bureau
thus can legally shift a substantial portion of the
costs of supplying irrigation water to other bene-
ficiaries ofFederal water, beyond the costs shifted
through the initial cost-allocation process. 21
3. Fixed-rate contracts: In contracts negotiated
before 1975, the Bureau established water rates for
each service area on an individual basis. That is, it
charged either an ability-to-pay price or a cost-of-
service figure for aservice area's shareoftotal CVP
costs, whichever was lower.
22 The Bureau also fol-
lowed a standard practice ofgranting irrigation dis-
tricts 40-year fixed rate contracts. But because of
this practice, the price realized during the life ofthe
contract failed to recover increased operational,
maintenance andnew-facility costs.
In 1975, the Bureau introduced several modifica-
tions in its pricing policies for new contracts. It
began to utilize an average-cost pricing method, by
dividing total systemcosts for a given period by the
number of units expected to be sold. It also intro-
ducedadjustmentclauses into its contractsto reflect
changes in costs. Butthese provisions calledfor rate
adjustments every five years to reflect only opera-
tion and maintenance costs, and every ten years to
reflect added capital costs. Finally, the first adjust-
Table 2
Imputed Costs (Cumulative) as a Percent of Realized Unit Price l
UnitPrice Operation Including Including Including
Fiscal Year As Realized and Maintenance2 Taxes Amortization Interest
1948-1960 100.00 84.9 241.3 350.2 490.1
1961 100.00 107.0 251.4 371.7 529.4
1962 100.00 92.0 214.6 319.0 452.7
1963 100.00 81.9 220.8 336.5 512.5
1964 100.00 33.8 170.9 287.5 466.7
1965 100.00 107.0 244.2 361.0 538.1
1966 100.00 116.5 244.0 348.0 502.7
1967 100.00 80.7 257.0 395.2 596.5
1968 100.00 9.8 173.0 298.7 548.7
1969 100.00 130.1 363.9 533.8 865.9
1970 100.00 81.2 210.7 306.7 492.4
1971 100.00 92.6 247.2 355.6 562.7
1972 100.00 79.1 205.2 293.6 459.0
1973 100.00 78.2 215.2 318.6 526.5
1974 100.00 62.9 163.2 240.5 394.0
1975 100.00 66.4 169.0 245.1 412.5
1976 100.00 67.2 148.6 208.9 342.5
1977 100.00 181.6 502.3 744.4 1293.9
1978 100.00 95.4 i92.4 291.8 513.9
1979 100.00 65.8 112.0 171.6 302.2
1980 100.00 86.1 148.5 229.0 441.4
1981 100.00 78.4 142.4 225.1 467.0
1 The imputed unit costs were calculated under the (historical) average-eost accounting method. In this table, each imputed cost item is
cumulativelyaddedandexpressedasapercentofrealizedprice. Forexample, in 1981, the additionofimputedtaxes andamortizationto
operationand maintenancecostsequalled$11.46/acre-foot. Thisfigure was225 percentofthe realized unitprice, or125 percenthigher.
2 In some years, the BureauofReclamationrealized a pricegreaterthan the costofoperation and maintenance alone. The imputedprice
reflecting only that onecostwould have been lowerthan the realized price.
43ment was delayed until long afterthe initialdelivery
of water. In 1981, the Bureau introduced further
reforms in this process, but the basic system still
had the same drawbacks as before.
4. Taxes: The Bureau of Reclamation pays no
local property taxes on lands occupied bythe Cen-
tral Valley Project. In contrast, privatewaterutili-
ties in California over the 1960-77 paid
annual property taxes averaging about 2.6 percent
of total plant investment. Their property tax
then dropped to an average of 1.7 percentof
capital investment during the 1978-81 a
resultofthe passage ofProposition 13.
5. Amortization:TheBureau is requiredby to
repay each dollar borrowed for investment in Fed-
eral irrigation facilities within50yearsafterthe first
delivery ofwater, but ithas not repaid such borrow-
ings on a systematic basis. With its low rates, in
fact, the agency frequently has failed to recover
even its annual operation andmaintenance costs, as
required by law. And with its inadequate revenues,
the Bureau actually has extended the repayment life
forallCVPirrigationfacilities eachtime new facili-
ties have been added to the system.
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The author has reestimated CVP irrigation costs
for the 1949-81 period on the basis ofthe method-
ology employed by privately-owned utilities. 24 The
adjustrpents for the "full cost" unit price, calcu-
lated under the historical average cost method-
ology, included the addition ofan imputedproperty
tax and interest return oninvestedcapital, aswell as
the recalculation of amortization of Congressional
appropriations for the irrigation function. All these
costs were determined on the basisofcapital invest-
ments valued at original prices. The author adopted
Bureau estimates of operation and maintenance
costs, and of the irrigation share of total CVP in-
vestment 1and 2).
With adjustments made for imputed property
taxes, amortization and interest costs, the Central
Valley ProjectactuaUy incurredan average unitcost
ofat least $23.77 peracre-footofirrigation waterin
1981, calculated on an historical accounting basis,
instead of the $5.09 per acre-foot actually realized
(Table 1). Had rates been raised to reflect this full
average cost, the price for CVP irrigation water in
1981 would have been 367 percent higher than the
amount actually charged (Table 2).
In any year, the difference between the
imputed historic full-cost unit price and the price
actually realized represents the total subsidy paidby
the general taxpayer and electrical power users for
each acre-foot ofirrigation water delivered. (In this
case, we used cost figures derived from plant and
equipmentvaluedatoriginalpurchaseprices.) Mul-
tiplying this subsidy bytotal acre-feetdelivered, we
2
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44obtain a total annual subsidy of $77 million for
1981, and of$966 million cumulative for the entire
1948~81period(Table 3).
The·interest subsidy is by far the largest single
contributorto the overall subsidy. In 1981, the sub-
sidy artlounted to $51 million, or 66 percent ofthe
total subsidy. Over the entire 1948-81 period it
amountedto about $484 million or50percentofthe
total subsidy.
Boththe average realized and imputed price rose
over the post-World War II period (Table 4 and
Chart 2). Because of the use of the historical-cost
approach, both realized and imputed prices (espe-
cially the latter) trended downward over time in
constant dollars however (Table 4 and Chart 3).
Nevertheless, had the Bureau charged the higher
imputedprice ratherthan the realized price, farmers
would have been encouraged to reduce their con-
sumptionof irrigation water. Instead, irrigators
increased their annual deliveries of water from an
annual average of0.78 million acre-feet during the
1948-60 period to 4.12 million acre-feet by 1981
(Appendix B, Table 1).
The average-cost figure of$24/acre-foot, as cal-
culated by the traditional private-utility accounting
method, is still only a fraction of the estimated
long-run incremental cost of $324/acre-foot. This
does not necessarily mean that the Central Valley
Table3
Estimated Annual Subsidy toUsersof
Central Valley Project IrrigationWater
(Historical Accounting Method)
Subsidy($Millions)
Fiscal Year Interest' Other" Total"
Total. 1948-1960 36.96 66.24 103.20
1961 5.39 9.28 14.67
1962 5.28 8.64 13.92
1963 9.03 12.13 21.16
1964 9.79 10.24 20.03
1965 9.86 14.53 24.39
1966 9.72 15.58 25.30
1967 9.55 14.01 23.56
1968 19.70 15.66 35.36
1969 19.42 25.37 44.79
1970 19.49 21.68 41.17
1971 19.41 23.95 43.36
1972 19.06 22.31 41.37
1973 22.63 23.79 46.42
1974 22.62 20.69 43.31
1975 27.87 24.16 52.03
1976 28.96 23.61 52.57
1977 31.43 36.86 68.29
1978 31.18 26.93 58.11
1979 30.80 16.88 47.68
1980 42.32 25.71 68.03
1981 50.69 26.23 76.92
Total,1948-1981 481.16 484.48 965.64
1 Derived by multiplying the imputed interest peracre-foot by the number
ofacre-feet sold.
2 Derived by subtracting the realized price from the interest-subsidized
imputed price and multiplying by the total acre-feet ofwater sold.
o Derived by subtracting the realized price from the full-cost imputed price
(historical accounting basis) and multiplying by the total acre-feet of
water sold.
Source: Computed by the author.
Chart3
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45Project faces decreasing returns to scale and in-
creasing long-run average costs. Those theoretical
concepts depictcost and outputalternativesfacing a
firm (or agency) at a moment of time under the
assumption ofconstanttechnology and factorprices
(Chart I-B). A firm would be operating in an output
range associated with increasing long-run average
costs ifexpansion to a larger scale plant (or system)
built from scratch today entailed higher average
costs than a smaller plant built today. In thatcase,
long-run incremental cost would be above average
cost, with both determined on the basis ofplantand
equipment valued at today's prices. This contrasts
with the traditional private-utility practice ofdeter-
mining average cost. Under that method, long-run
incremental cost would be above average cost sim-
ply because of the failure of the utility industry's
average-cost methodology to reflect the effects of
inflation on equipment prices.
To determine whether the CVP may in fact be
facing increasing long-run average costs due to the
exhaustion of economies of scale, we have esti-
mated the average cost of irrigation water with
capital costs valued at current replacement prices
rather than historical prices. Under the replacement
accounting method, we have valued the entire plant
in 1981 dollars, and have then compared the incre-
mental cost of water from new plant with the aver-
age cost from the existing system, both valued at
today's prices (Table 5).
The aggregate value of annual plant investment
in 1981 dollars, $1.7 billion, represents the replace-
ment value of the entire system. After calculating
that value, we next calculated the average or unit
cost ofirrigation water from this sytem by dividing
the total annual cost (capital, operation and main-
tenance, and taxes) by the number of acre-feet de-
livered.
25 This procedure yielded a $48/acre-foot
average replacement cost for irrigation water, and a
Table 4
Constant DollarRealized and Imputed Unit Prices
(Dollars peracre-foot)
Current Dollar Unit Price Constant Dollar Unit Price"
Imputed Imputed imputed Imputed
Unit Price Interest-Subsidized Full-Cost Producer Unit Price Interest-Subsidized Full-Cost
Fiscal Year As Realized UnitPrice UnitPrice' Price Index' As Realized Unit Price Unit PriceI
1948-1960 2.83 9.91 13.87 38.82 7.28 25.53 35.72
1961 3.48 12.93 18.41 3918 8.88 32.99 46.99
1962 1.93 6.17 8.76 39.08 4.95 15.79 22.41
1963 2.37 7.99 12.17 39.15 6.07 20.41 31.09
1964 3.32 9.55 15.51 39.13 8.49 24.42 39.63
1965 2.14 7.72 11.50 39.46 5.42 19.56 29.15
1966 3.33 11.60 16.76 40.55 8.22 28.62 41.33
1967 1.88 7.42 11.20 41.44 4.53 17.91 27.03
1968 7.87 23.51 43.19 42.23 18.64 55.67 102.28
1969 2.47 13.20 21.41 43.56 5.68 30.31 49.16
1970 4.16 12.75 20.46 45.35 9.17 28.11 45.13
1971 3.47 12.35 19.55 46.67 7.44 26.46 41.88
1972 4.46 13.09 20.46 48.02 9.29 27.26 42.62
1973 3.29 10.48 17.32 50.60 6.50 20.71 34.23
1974 3.70 8.90 14.57 56.82 6.51 15.66 25.65
1975 4.20 10.31 17.34 65.41 6.43 15.76 26.52
1976 6.84 14.29 23.43 70.20 9.74 20.35 33.37
1977 5.41 40.29 70.02 74.44 7.27 54.12 94.06
1978 4.02 11.72 20.64 79.96 5.02 14.66 25.81
1979 5.83 10.01 17.63 88.04 6.63 11.37 20.02
1980 4.55 10.42 20.08 100.00 4.55 10.42 20.08
1981 5.09 11.46 23.77 109.23 4.66 10.49 21.76
, Calculated on the basis ofthe historical average-cost accounting method.
2 Producer price index. all finished goods. 1980=100.
" Dollars per acre/foot in constant dollars; derived by dividing current dollar prices by producer price index.
46total 1981 subsidy of nearly $175 million.
26 The
difference between this figure and the much higher
incremental cost suggests that the Central Valley
Project is operating in an. output range ofincreasing
long~run average cost, reflecting decreasing returns
to scale.
Economists would argue that, for efficient allo~
cation of resources, the Bureau of Reclamation
should price all CVP irrigation wateron the basis of
long~run incremental cost, estimated here at about
$324/acre-fooL A second-best option would be for
the Bureau to price water at least on the basis ofthe
estimated $48/acre-foot replacement average cost.
Only thatapproach would permit recovery ofthe
true.cost to society ofthe resources tied up in sup-
plying water. Recovery of the estimated $24/acre-
foot historical average cost, although an improve-
ment over current Bureau practice, would not

























Would higher prices for CVP irrigation water by soil and climatic conditions, and that it is invari-
lead to areduction in the quantity demanded? Some ant to higher water prices. Thus, because of the
analysts argue in the negative, because ofagricul- limited technical substitutability between water and
ture's essential need for water. They maintain that a other productive inputs,27 demand for irrigation
given amount of water is required to produce a wateris price inelastic, i.e., relatively unresponsive
given yield for any crop, that the amount is dictated to a higher (or lower) price.
28 Proponents of this
TableS
Imputed Unit Price ofCentral Valley Irrigation Water,
Replacement Average CostMethod
Investment Investment
inIrrigationPlant I Conversion Factor" in Irrigation Plant
























Replacement Cost Per Acre-Foot (1981 Dollars) = (Capital Costa + Operation & Maintenance Cost + Property Taxes)/Acre-Feet of
Irrigation Water Delivered
($166.57 m. + $16.45 m. + $13.43 m.)/4.12 m.
= $47.69
1 Excluding distribution-system investment from canalside to farmgate underCVP, 9-c water service contracts.
2 Calculated by dividing the 1981 implicit price deflatorfor producerdurable equipment by the actual deflator for each year.
a Capital cost ofthe entire project (1981 dollars) multiplied by a IO-percent real interest rate.
Source: Annual Investment Data: U.S. Bureau ofReclamation, Mid-Pacific Regional Office, Sacramento. Computation by author.
47thesis consequently maintain that resorting to high-
er prices to allocate available supplies would be
ineffective.
Examination ofthe literature shows that the elas-
ticity ofdemand for irrigation water varies accord-
ing to the price range being considered. 29 That is,
the responsiveness ofquantity demanded to agiven
percentage change in price varies along a given
demand schedule. Early studies covering the 1950's
and early 1960's supported the argument for inelas-
tic demand. 30
But those results were biased by the absente ofa
wide range of observable prices over which to test
the demand responsiveness. More recent studies,
based either on observed water-use and price com-
binations or on linear-programming estimation
techniques replicating the cost-minimizing behav-
iorofCaliforniafarmers, show thatwaterdemand is
price elastic at aprice ofover$20 peracre-foot. One
of the latest studies, which utilizes an even more
advanced programming model of Central Valley
agriculture, shows an elasticity coefficient of -1.5
for a price range of $25-35/acre-foot. 31 For prices
above $35/acre-foot, the elasticity coefficient then
drops to -0.5.31
In summary, at water prices prevailing currently,
agricultural water demand is not very price respon-
sive, but it should respond substantially at higher
prices. Indeed, given a demand of3.8 million acre-
feet at a price of$25/acre-foot, and given an elastic-
ity coefficient of-1.5, a ten-percent price increase
would reduce the quantity demanded by 570,000
acre-feet. This would be sufficient to eliminate the
need for the proposed Auburn-Folsom project.
To maximize profit from any given crop on a
given parcel of land, a farmer will purchase and
apply additional units of water until its marginal
revenue product equals its price.
33 The "marginal
revenue product" refers to the net addition to total
revenue resulting from the last increment ofwater,
after subtraction of all other non-water operating
(variable) and capital (fixed) costS.
34
Farmers might react in three different ways to
sharply higher prices of CVP irrigation water. 35
Table 6
IndicatorsofImpactofHigherWater Price






































































I Crop ranking basedon valueofproduction, 1980.
2 Watercost excludescostofapplication. Total production costs include all variable and fixed cultural and harvest costs (includingwater
application), imputed rent on land and return to management. The latter two returns are actually part of profits and should not be
included in costs, but were included here becauseoflackofrelevant data.
Source: California Department of Food and Agriculture, California Agriculture Statistical Review, 1980. Giannini Foundation of
Agriculture Economics, Agricultural Water Use andCosts in California, Information Series 80-2, Bulletin 1896.
48First, ifa given crop still represents the most profit- For all 15 of California's major crops, water
ableopportllnity on a· given parcel of land, the currently comprises a small percentage oftotal pro-
farmermightcontinuetogrow the samecropbutcut duction costs·(Table 6). This reflects the low level
back waterusage to the point where its marginal ofcurrentwaterprices,andsuggests why the price
revenue product equals the higher price. This cut- elasticity ofdemand at currentranges is generally
back would be accompanied by SOme reduction in low. Nevertheless, the data also showconsiderable
crop output or introduction ofmore efficient irriga- variability inthe importance ofwater costs among
tion methods. Alternatively, the farmer might shift various products.
to another crop that yields a higher net return per For certain field crops--especially, hay, wheat
acre·foot of water, which could mean a shift away and corn--water costs comprise a relatively large
from low-valued field crops to higher-valued spe- proportion of total production costs. This factor
cialty crops. Or again, the farmer might simply alone suggests that any given increase in water
withdraw land from irrigation, ifirrigated crops fail prices wouldaffect those products significantly. On
to yield a positive profit or ifthey yield less profit the other hand, water comprises a relatively small
than dry-land farming. In summary, if the price of percentage of total costs for tomatoes, peaches,
water is raised, farmers may react by reducing out- lettuce, grapes and nuts. In reaction to higher water
put, changing the input mix (for example, using prices, farmers thus might tend to switch away from
more capital intensive irrigation methods), and/or field crops to specialty crops such as those.
shifting cropping patterns. California farmers also account for a relatively
The elasticity of demand for irrigation water small share of total domestic production of field
varies significantly, depending On type of crop. crops. For com,wheat and hay, for example, their
Price elasticity increases, in general, the greater is shares of the national market amount to only 0.5,
the substitutability ofother factor inputs for water, 3.6 and 5.9 percent, respectively (Table 6). This
andthe greateris the watershare oftotal production suggests a relatively elastic demand for water, due
costs. But elasticity varies inversely with the ability to farmers' inability to influence the price of the
offarmers to pass on higher water costs to cansum- final product and thereby pass on higher water costs
ers in the form ofhigherfood and fiber prices. to consumers. .
V. Summary and Conclusions
Ifefficiency ofresource allocationwere the only point would be pricing of irrigation water on the
criterion, the BureauofReclamationwouldprice all basis ofaverage cost, determined on a replacement
irrigation water from the Central Valley Project on cost basis. This method would at least recover the
the basis oflong-run incremental cost-the cost of cost of the resources already embodied in the sys-
delivering an additional acre-foot ofwater from the tem, valued at today's prices. It would also enable
next scheduled block of new capacity. This the Bureau to generate sufficient revenue to perpet-
approach would be the most efficient because it uate the existing capacity. A case also could be
would make·customers aware of the cost of the made for the Bureau to include all costelements that
resources required to bring them additional water. would be.incurred bya debt-financed private in-
But this approach also would return huge annual vestor-owned utility-annual operation and main-
profits to the Bureau ofReclamation or to the U.S. tenance costs,plus interest expense and property
Treasury. This is because long-run incremental cost taxes (opportunity-cost basis), plus steady amorti-
isfar higherthanthe system'saverage costofirriga- zation ofcapitalbdrrowedfromtheU.s. Treasury.
tion watet, detennined as· econoIllists would· mea- Pricing onthis basis would at least make custom-
sure average cost orrthe basis ofreplacement value ers aware ofthe resources already expended in the
of plant. In addition, a switchover to strict incre- system, and would provide fanners with a strong
mental costpricingcouldcauseamajorshrinkage in incentive to reduce waterconsumption. In Iact,
both water usage and the size ofCalifornia's agri- empirical studies suggest that agricultural demand
cultural sector. . ... . •.. is elastic above a retail price of around $20 per
The second-best option from an efficiency stand- acre-foot.
49When Congress passed the Reclamation Act of
1902, it clearly intended beneficiaries. of Federal
water projects to repay their original construction
costs as well as operating costs. Itprovideda sub-
sidy, however, by not requiring repaymentofinter-
est on capital invested, and later increased that
subsidy through the ability to pay concept andother
measures. In some years indeed, irrigation water
rates have even failed to recover operation and
maintenance costs, despite the legal requirement to
do so. Moreoever, had the Bureau priced irrigation
water to reflect all costs measured on a replacement
accounting basis, the average realized priceby 1981
would have been nearly ten times as high as the
price actually realized.
By charging highly subsidized rates for Federal
irrigation water, the Bureau has spurred the growth
ofconsumption beyond the growth that would oth-
erwise have occurred had it priced water to reflect
the true average costofservice. Had itpriced water
on the basis of long-run incremental cost,.the
amount ofresources devoted to the construction of
Federal irrigation projects in California wouldhave
been still smaller. Instead, the consumption of
water and the size of the Federal irrigation system
have expanded beyond the point where the net
return to the last unit of water, in terms ofagricul-
tural revenue, is equal to the cost ofsupplying that
extra unit. This suggests that more resources have
been devoted to the construction of the Federal
irrigation system in California than are warranted
by agricultural benefits.
The social objectives that justified the earlier
granting ofsubsidies-namely, the developmentof
the arid West-may no longer be appropriate.
Today's environment is dominated by intense com-
petition for water among competing users-house-
holds, energy producers, and farmers. To some
observers, the correct policy issue remains the
perennial one-whatsize farms should get the sub-
sidy? Should the 160-acre limit be enforced or ex-
panded? Others would argue, however, that there
should be no water subsidy at all. In this view, the
focus should be on pricing reform, to improve the
efficiency of water usage through the use of more
efficient irrigation methods and shifts to less water
intensive crops. Indeed, Congress logically should
give more attention to the role of the price mecha-
nism in reducing the projected growth ofirrigation
water demand, not only in California but through-
out the West.
= Initial Capital Outlay
Stream ofCapital Costs
















ProposedAuburn - Folsom South Unit
The following technical note describes the methodology and assumptions employed by the author to
estimate the incremental cost of irrigation water from the proposed Auburn-Folsom South Unit. The
incremental cost of irrigation water from this project includes the capital costs (depreciation and interest),
taxes, and operation and maintenance expenses to be recovered over the project's life. Each ofthese costs is
expressed as a stream overtime and then discounted to determine present value. (However, the present value
ofthe capital costs can be shownto beequal tothe initial construction costs). The annual cost is then equal to
the real interest rate multiplied by this present value. We add these annual costs and then divide by the
expected average annual output inacre-feet.
The real interest rate is used to discount capital costs. Taxes and operation and maintenace costs are
discounted by the nominal interest rate, because they are assumed to reflect inflation in the future. We
assumed both the annual property tax and depreciation rates to be 2 percentofplant value, based on the 1981
tax rate and on a 50-yearservice life for plantandequipment. We used areal discount rate of 10 percent and a
nominal interest rate of 16 percent as the discountfactors.
Variable List:






50Each ofthe cost streams can be expressed as follows:
K = (r+S)k, (r+S)k(1-S),(r+S)k(1-S)2,(r+S)k(l-S)3
T = tK+tK(1-S),tK(1-S)2,tK(1-S)3, ...
OM = om(l+II),om(1+IW,om(1 + IT)3 ,
Taking the present value ofeachcost stream:
PV(K)
PV(T)
(r+8)k (r+S)k(l-S) (r+S)k(I-8)2 (r+S)k(l-6i =--+ + + +. l+r (l+r)2 (l+r)3 (l+r)4
tk tk(l-S) tk(I-6)2 tk(l-6)3




am + om(l+ II) om(l+ IT)2 om(l + IT)3
PV(OM) = (1+i) (l+i)2 + (1 +i)3 + (1 +i)4 +
am am
= i-II =-r-
Multiplying the present value ofeach cost stream by the real rate of interest and dividing by production of
440,000 acre-feet yields an incremental cost of$324/Acre Foot ofWater














AdjustmentofCentral Vaney Project's Realized Average Price
(Private UtilityBasis)
The following technical note describes the meth-
odology used by the author to adjust the Central
Valley Project's realized average pricefor irrigation
water delivered at canalside for the 1948-81 period,
to include the major cost items and historical ac-
counting methodology employedby private-owned
water utilities. The realized and imputed prices ap-
pearin Appendix B, Tables I and2 respectively.
Taxes: Annual were im-
puted by applying the average property-tax rate for
two privately-owned California water utilities in
any givenyear to the Central Valley Project's total
irrigation plant in service ofthat year, valued on
an historical cost basis.
Amortization: Amortization costs were imputed
annually for the 1948-81 period by developing a
straight-line depreciation schedule. Depreciation
51
was calculated by applying the average life ofser-
vice ofthe equipment to the total value ofthe plant
in service, measured on an historical (original) cost
basis. This amortization procedure follows that
used by most private utilities. The average service
lifeofthe CVP'stotal irrigation plantis estimatedto
be 75 years. For any given year, depreciation thus
was calculated as 1/75th ofthe total value ofirriga-
tion plant in service. Since depreciation is cal-
culated on a 75-year basis, compared with the
Bureau responsibility to recover borrowingswithin
a 50-year peri()d, depreciation charges thus.cal-
culated would fall short of meeting the CVP's
payment responsibilities. A reconciliation charge
therefore was calculated, representing the differ-
ence between l/50thand 1/75th ofthe value ofthe
plant in service.Interest: Interest payments on an opportunity-
cost basis were imputed for any given year n by the
formula:
n
Pn = 2: iy A y
Y= 1948
where: Pn= total interest payment in year n
iy = Moody's Aaa interest rate on public
(private investor) utility issues in
year y
Ay = unamortized portion ofappropriations
received in year y as ofyear n
This formula simply states that total interest pay-
ments in any given year Pn' equal the sum of all
interest payments on outstanding CVP debt in that
year. In other words, total interest payments equal
new debt (for irrigation plant) times the prevailing
interest rate, plus any unamortized old debt multi-
plied by the rate(s) in effect when the debt was
incurred. The first debt was assumed to be incurred
in 1948, the earliest date for which data were avail-
able. Each increment in debt was amortized on a
straight-line basis by 1/50 each year after it was
incurred, in line with the 50-year payback period
specified by law. Note that Moody's Investor Ser-
vice refers to private investor-owned utilities as
public utilities, using that term in a general sense.
A consistent series showing annual Congres-
sional appropriations to the CVP was not available.
A proxy for "new debt" was developed by taking
the total value of the plant in service, i.e., the
capital stock, and calculating the annual change,
i.e., the new investment added each year. That
proxy was used under the assumption that borrow-
ing was for capital investment.
Appendix B, Table 1
Average Pricefor Central Valley Irrigation Water, As Realized
Realized
Fiscal Year Revenues' Water Sales3 UnitPrice4
1948-1960
1 2.20 .78 2.83
1961 3.42 .98 3.48
1962 3.95 2.04 1.93
1963 5.13 2.16 2.37
1964 5.46 1.64 3.32
1965 5.57 2.60 2.14
1966 6.28 1.88 3.33
1967 4.75 2.53 1.88
1968 7.88 1.00 7.87
1969 5.85 2.36 2.47
1970 10.49 2.52 4.16
1971 9.37 2.70 3.47
1972 11.52 2.58 4.46
1973 10.89 3.31 3.29
1974 14.73 3.98 3.70
1975 16.65 3.96 4.20
1976 21.68 3.17 6.84
1977 5.72 1.06 5.41
1978 14.04 3.50 4.02
1979 23.58 4.04 5.83
1980 19.93 4.38 4.55
1981 20.99 4.12 5.10
1 Annual average computed from cumulative totals for the 12-yearperiod 1948-1960.
2 Millions ofdollars. Revenues from irrigation sal~s u~der 9-c water-service contracts as reported by the U.S. Bureau ofReclamation.
3 Millions ofacre-feet.
4 Dollars peracre-foot. Derived by dividing revenues from watersales to irrigation districts by acre-feet ofwater sold.
Source: Revenues and sales data from U.S. Bureau ofReclamation, Mid-Pacific Regional Office. Realized unit price derived from that
data by authoras described in footnote 4.







Operation Property DeprecIation 8< ExcludIng SUbsIdized Full-Cost
FlscalYeer Maintenance Tax' Depreciation" Amorllzatlon' Interest In_I' FullCosts' UnitPrlce UnltPrlce
lDOllanl/acre-'oot)
1948-1960 1.87 3.45 1.60 .80 7.72 3.08 10.80 9.91 13.87
1961 3.65 4.93 2.74 1.37 IM9 5.39 18.08 12.93 18.41
1962 3.63 4.84 275 1.37 12.59 5.28 17.86 6.17 8.76
1963 4.20 7.12 3.96 1.98 17.26 9.03 26.28 7.99 12.17
1964 1.85 7.49 4.25 2.12 15.70 9.79 25.49 9.55 15.51
1965 5.96 7.64 4.34 2.17 20.10 9.86 29.96 7.72 11.50
1966 7.32 8.01 4.36 2.18 21.87 9.72 31.59 11.60 16.76
1967 3.83 8.36 4.37 2.19 18.76 9.55 28.31 7.42 11.20
1968 .77 12.87 6.60 3.30 23.54 19.71 43.24 23.51 43.19
1969 7.61 13.67 6.63 3.31 31.22 19.42 50.64 13.20 21.41
1970 8.52 13.59 6.71 3.36 32.17 19.49 41.66 12.75 20.46
1971 8.68 14.48 6.77 3.39 33.32 19.41 52.73 12.35 19.55
1972 9.12 14.52 6.79 3.40 33.83 19.06 52.89 13.09 20.46
1973 8.51 14.91 7.50 3.75 34.68 22.63 57.31 10.48 17.32
1974 9.26 14.79 7.58 3.79 35.43 22.62 58.05 8.90 14.57
1975 11.05 17.09 8.44 4.22 40.81 27.87 68.68 10.31 17.34
1976 14.56 17.65 8.72 4.36 45.28 28.97 74.25 14.29 23.43
1977 10.39 18.35 9.23 4.62 42.58 31.43 74.01 40.29 70.02
1978 13.40 13.61 9.31 4.65 40.97 31.18 72.15 11.72 20.64
1979 15.53 10.89 9.36 4.68 40.46 30.80 71.26 10.01 17.63
1980 17.15 12.44 10.70 5.35 45.63 42.32 87.95 10.42 20.08
1981 16.45 13.43 11.55 5.78 47.21 50.69 97.91 11.46 23.77
1 These costs represent the author's interpretation of the amounts that should have been recovered directly by the U,S. Bureau of Reclamation in the form of revenues for water
delivered to irrigation districts ifthe Central Valley Project had been operating as a private investor~owned utility. using the historical average~cost accounting method to determine
unit price. The costs consistofthe variable costs as actually measuredand reported by that agency. pluscomputationsoffix.edcosts to include imputedproperty-tax payments, interest
charges reflecting the opportunity cost ofcapital. and astraight·line depreciation and amortization charge to repay all outstanding debt on a consistent and continuous basis,
:l Derived by applying an estimated California property·tax rate for private investor·owned water utilities (property taxes paid as a percentage oftotal plant in service) to the Central
Valley Project's total irrigation plant (excluding CVP·financed distribution facilities from irrigation districts to the fann gate), valued on an historical-cost basis.
:1 Private water utilities recover their long-tenn borrowings for capital investment through their depreciation charges. The average service life of the Central Valley Project's total
irrigation plant is estimated to be 75 years. Straight·line depreciation has been used so that depreciation is 1/75th of the total value of the plant in service. measured on an
historica!·cost basis.
4 Depreciation is calculated on an average 75·year basis, whereas the Central Valley Project is required to amortize (pay back) its horrowings within a maximum of50 years, The
.'reconciliation" charges represent the difference between 1/50th and 1175th ofthe value ofirrigation plant in service.
~, Derived on an "opportunity cost" basis: total interest payments in each year equal the product of new debt and the current Moody's average Aaa interest rate for public (private
investor~owned)utilities, plus the productofold amortizeddebtand the interest rate in effect when the debt was incurred. Debt is reduced (amortized) on a straight~line basisby 1/50th
each year after it is incurred. Total value of irrigation plant in service was used as a proxy in detennining outstanding debt, under the assumption that borrowing was for capital
investment.
Ii Purchasers ofCentral Valley Project irrigation water have been allowed an interest subsidy by law (Le., the Bureau ofReclamation is not required to recover through its rates any
interest on public funds appropriated by Congress forCentral Valley inigation projects), Therefore, we calculate aprice without interest(i.e" an interest~subsidized imputed price) in
addition to the full-cost unit price. Prices are in dollars peracre·foot.
Source: For data pertaining to the private·utiJity sector: Moody's Investors Services. Moody's Public Utilities Manual. Average property·tax rates per year derived from data for
California Water Service Company and Southern California Water Company. For reported data pertaining to the Central Valley Project. U.S, Bureau ofReclamation. Mid
Pacific regional office, Sacramento.
FOOTNOTES
1. For the most comprehensive recent assessment of the
long-term outlook for U.S. and California water supplies
and demands see, U.S. Water Resources Council,The
Nation's Water Resources 1975-2000 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Water Resources Council, 1978). See espe-
cially, Volume 3: Analytical Data Summary and Volume 4:
California •Region, pp. 17-30. Also, Governor's Com-
mission to Review California Water Rights Law, Final
Report (Sacramento, December 1978).
2. Southern California refers to the area south of the
Tehachapi Mountain Range, the natural barrierthatsets the
south apart from the rest ofthe state. An acre-footofwater
is the amount of water required to cover one acre one foot
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deep. The measure is equal to 325,851 gallons of water.
California's loss of Colorado River water will occur as a
result of a
Arizona is entitled to over one-half of the Colorado
that has been corning to California, The diversion will
place as soon as the Central Arizona Project is completed,
making the re-routing possible.
3. The literature On the pricing ofwater is relatively sparse
compared with thatfor other important resources such as
energy and non-fuel minerals. Important. contributions
include: Jack Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven and Jerome
W. Milliman, WaterSupply Economics,Technologyand
Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960);Joseph Bain, Richard Cavesand Julius Margolis, Northern
California's WaterIndustry(Baltimore: Resources forthe
Future, 1966); Charles E. Phelps, Morlie H. Graubard,
David L. Jaqquette et.al., Efficient Water Use in Cali-
fornia (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, November
1978); and Donald Erlenkotter, Michael Haneman, Richard
E. Howittand HenryJ. Vaux, Jr., "The Economics ofWater
Development and Use in California," California·Water
Planning and Policy, Selected Issues (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California, June 1979), pp. 169-207.
4. For a discussion of the social objectives embodied in
early reclamation law, see E. Phillip Le Veen, "Reclamation
Policy at the Crossroads," Public Affairs Report, Vol. 19
(Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, October
1978). Also, Alan R. Dickerman, George E. Radosevich
and Kenneth C. Nobe, Foundation of Federal Reclama-
tion Policies; an Historical Review of Changing Goals
and Objectives (Fort Collins: Colorado State University,
1968); William E. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
5. For a description of the average-cost pricing method-
ology followed by private investor-owned water utilities in
establishing the level of rates, see American Water Works
Association, Water Rates Manual (Denver: American
Water Works Association, 1972).
6. For private investor-owned utilities, the return on in-
vested capital consists of three components: 1) interest
payments on bonded indebtedness, 2) dividends on pre-
ferred stock, and 3) a return to common-equity holders, a
residual amount which becomes available to these owners
only after all other legitimate claims of the company have
been settled. The first two are specified on the bond inden-
ture and the preferred-stock certificates. At present, Fed-
eral reclamation law does not require the Bureau of Recla-
mation to recover any return on long-term borrowings for
investment in the Central Valley Project irrigation system.
We argue in this article, however, that reclamation law
should be changed to require the return of interest to the
U.S. Treasury for funds appropriated for such investment,
and that the rate of interest should be determined on an
opportunity-cost principle.
7. For proof that marginal-cost pricing of all goods and
services leads to optimum welfare, see Edward Berlin,
Charles J. Cicchetti and William J. Gillen, Perspective on
Power, A Study of the Regulation and Pricing of Elec-
tric Power, A Report to the Energy Policy Project of the
Ford Foundation (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Com-
pany, 1975), pp. 127-130.
8. In a perfect-competition model, there is one situation in
which short and long-run marginal (incremental) costs are
equal-that is, in long-run competitive equilibrium. In this
situation, plant capacity has been adjusted to its optimum
size for achieving a given level ofoutput. It is assumed that
a firm starts from scratch in planning its optimal-size pro-
duction facility. In reality, this optimum is never realized.
Instead, firms operatewith plantsofvarious ages, and must
make decisions with regard to adding new capacity, either
for replacementorgrowth purposes. Pricing on the basis of
short-run costs would not necessarily recover the capital
costs associated with this new plant.
Marginal cost, strictly speaking, refers to the additional cost
of supplying a single, infinitesimally small additional
54
amount. Incremental cost refers to the average additional
cost of a larger finite addition to production. Since rate
changes are relatively infrequent, additions tooutputwhere
costs must be recovered are of an incremental rather than
marginal magnitude.
9. The cost curves for an individual firm are drawn under
the assumption that the firm has no influence on the prices
of the factors of production it uses. Internal economies
therefore are those enjoyed byafirm apartfrom anychange
in factor prices. When an industry as a whole expands its
output, the prices of factor inputsmaybeaffected. External
economies affect the slope ofthe industry supply curve.
10. This chart, to emphasize, depicts the economic model
ofdecreasing long-run averagecoststhatoriginallycharac-
terized the operationsofindividual utilityfirms and led regu-
lators to prescribe average rather than incremental-cost
pricing. The cost schedules shown in Chart 1A depict the
behavior of long-run average and incremental costs at a
given point in time. Capital costs-I.e., amortization and
interest-aredetermined on the basis ofthe current cost of
plant and equipment valued at the time of the planning
decision. This conforms with the economist's definition of
average and incremental cost. Although this model provid-
ed the rationale for pricing on the basis of average cost,
regulatory commissions have prescribed the historical ac-
counting method for valuing plant and equipment. This
method differs from the economic model in that average
costs are determinedon the basis ofplantvalued atoriginal
cost. As we shall see, most utility commissions continue to
prescribe average-cost pricing even though utilities are
currently characterized by increasing long-run incremental
costs, even in the static sense as defined in economic
theory.
11. For a physical description of this project see, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, A
Financial Analysis of the Authorized Central Valley
Project, Past, Present, Future (Sacramento: Bureau of
Reclamation, May 1972), pp.7-9. For a summary of the
official cost-benefit analysis of the projectsee, U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior, Water and Power Resources Service,
A Summary of Economic Reanalysis Related to the
Auburn-Folsom South UnitCentralValleyProject,Cali-
fornia (Sacramento: Waterand Power Resources Service,
September1980). This analysiswas challengedbythe U.S.
General Accounting Office, Federal Charges for Irriga-
tion Projects Reviewed Do Not Cover Costs (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Comptroller General of the United States, 1981),
pp. 23-27 and 44-72.
12. In its cost-benefit analysis ofthe Auburn-Folsom South
Unit project, the Bureau of Reclamation estimated the aver-
age annual output of the project to be 550,000 acre-feet of
irrigation water annually. Discussion with the staff of the
General Accounting Office and the California Department
of Water Resources indicated that the 440,000 acre-foot
estimate is more realistic.
13. Thesefigures are as of the beginning of1982 (January
1, 1982) and therefore really reflect costs as of 1981. See,
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,
Project Data Sheet (Sacramento: Bureau of Reclamation,
January 1, 1982). In developing our estimate of long-run
incremental cost, we subtracted out the estimated distribu-
tion cost from canalside to farmgate.14. For the methodology for determining the long-run in-
cremental cost of water, see Hirshleifer et. aI., op. cit.
pp. 152-165. Due to the absence ofadditional literature on
long-run incremental costs, the author had to use literature
available in the electric utility area. See, for example,
Charles R. Cichetti, William G. Gillen and Paul Smolensky,
The Marginal Cost and Pricing of Electricity: An Ap-
plied Approach (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Com-
pany, 1977; Charles R. Scherer, Estimating Electric
Power System Marginal Costs (Amsterdam: North HoI-
land Publishing Company, 1977; and Ralph Turvey, Opti-
mal Pricing and Investment in Electricity Supply, An
Essayin Applied Welfare Economics (Cambridge: Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, 1968).
15. Office ofManagementand Budget, Executive Officeof
the President, "Discount Rates to be Used in Evaluating
Time-Distributed Costs and Benefits," Circular No. A-94,
Revised (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and
Budget, March27, 1972). The 10-percentreal discount rate
called for in this policy memorandum is still in effect.
16. The General Accounting Office estimated the long-run
incremental costofirrigation waterfrom theAuburn-Folsom
South Unit project at canalside to be $73.17 in 1978, with
interest at 7V2 percent. Our figure is much higher because
of the use of later cost data and methodological changes.
See U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Chargesfor
Irrigation Projects Reviewed Do Not Cover Costs, op.
cit., page 58.
17. For affirmation of this point see, Ibid, pp. 1, and 9-10.
Also, E. Phillip Le Veen, op. cit., page 1 and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Reforming Interest Provisions in
Federal Water Laws Could Save Millions (Washington,
D.C.: Controller General of the United States, October 22,
1981), page 5.
18. The U.S. General Accounting Office reached this con-
clusion in a recent study ofthe interestsubsidy. Reforming
Interest Provisions in Federal Water Laws Could Save
Millions, op. cit., page 19. That agency argues for the use
ofthe "constant maturities yield" rate series.
19. U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Chargesfor
Irrigation Projects Reviewed Do not Cover Costs, op.
cit., pp. 4-10.
20. Ibid, pp. 10-11 and 15-19.
21. The Bureau of Reclamation uses the "separate costs-
remaining benefits" method of allocating total projectcosts
to various functions, Le., water, electric power, flood con-
trol, etc. Critics charge that the Bureau does not allot a
sufficient proportion oftotal costs to the irrigation function.
For a description of that process see, U.S. Department of
the Interior, Office ofAuditand Investigation, Reviewofthe
Central Valley Project Bureau of Reclamation (Wash-
ington,.D,C,: Office of Auditan<:llnvestigation; January
1978), Appendix III. For a critical evaluation see, Ralph
NadarAssociates, Damming theWest.
22. U.S. Department of the Interior, Water and Power
Resources Service, CentralValleyProjectWaterService
Rate Policy(Sacramento: January8, 1981), pp. 1-3.
23. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Audit and
Investigation, op. cit., page 63.
24. Majorcost items were included only if appropriate. For
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example, the return to equity owners was excluded be-
cause the Central Valley Project is financed solely through
Congressional appropriations.
25. Capital costsequalthe presentvalue ofthetotal invest-
ment in plant, valued in current dollars. Again, we used a
real discount rate of 10percent for this calculation.
26. Thedifferencebetween this replacementcostestimate
($47.69/acre foot) and the average price actually realized
bythe Bureau for CVP irrigation water in 1981 ($5.09/acre-
foot), multiplied bythe numberofacre-feetofwaterdeliver-
ed (4.12 million acre-feet) yields an estimated total subsidy
to irrigators ofnearly $175 million for thatyear.
27. For a discussion of this view, characterized as the
"water-is-different syndrome," see Maurice Kelso. "The
Water is Different Syndrome, or What is Wrong with the
Water Industry?" Paper Presented at the Third American
Water Resources Conference, American Water Resources
Association, San Francisco, California, 1967.
28. The formula for arc elasticity of demand is percentage
change in quantity divided by percentage change in price.
The resultant numerical value is the coefficient of price
elasticity. When the elasticity coefficient exceeds one, de-
mand is said to be elastic. When the value ofthe elasticity
coefficient is less than one, demand is said to be inelastic.
And when the value of the coefficient is one, demand has
unitary elasticity.
29. For a summary of this literature see, Larry D. Schel-
horse, et. aI., TheMarketStructureofthe Southern Cali-
fornia Water Industry (La Jolla: Copley International Cor-
poration, June 1974, pp. 167-175.
30. For example, based on a cross-section sample of 38
irrigation districts in California in 1958, Bain estimated a
price elasticity of demand of -0.64. See Joseph Bain, et.
aI., op. cit., page 176.
31. This estimate was reached by Richard E. Howitt, Wil-
liam D. Watson and Richard M. Adams, "A Reevaluation of
Price Elasticities for Irrigation Water," Water Resources
Research (August 1980), page 623. These authors used a
quadratic programming model.
32. Ibid.
33. Fora detailedanalysisoftheconceptofthe demandfor
irrigation water see, Joseph Bain, et. aI., op. cit., pp. 675-
686. These authors refer to marginal revenue product as
"netvalue of marginal product."
34. The Bureau of Reclamation uses a marginal principle
in calculating paymentcapacity but calculates the measure
incorrectly. The agency determines the additional gross
revenue attributable to a new increment of irrigation water,
but the agency then incorrectly subtracts out all additional
variable and fixed·costs plus a return on investment to
arrive at a residual value that represents the amount the
farmer can afford to pay for water. As correctly measured,
marginal revenue product should be the additional profit
yielded by the last increment ofwater. Profit should not be
treated asacost, asisthe practice oftheBureau. Instead, it
shouldconstitute the residual valuethat measures abilityto
pay. By treating the return to management and investment
as a cost, the Bureau underestimates "ability to pay."
35. Joseph Bain, et. aI., op. cit., pp. 679-681.